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After the Great Recession: Regulating 
Financial Services for Low- and 
Middle-Income Communities† 
Ronald J. Mann* 
I. Introduction 
I was asked several months ago to talk about payday lending 
on a television program hosted by Jesse Jackson. I’ve written 
about payday lending in the past,1 and because I have not 
condemned it entirely, my initial impression was that I was 
expected to provide a devil’s advocate perspective that would 
collapse under withering questioning from the Reverend Jackson. 
But when the show was filmed, nothing could be further from the 
truth. The questions he wanted to talk about were things like 
“Why won’t banks serve our communities anymore?” and “Why do 
people hate payday lenders so much?” and finally, “What do our 
communities need to know to use this product safely?” The other 
guests were legislators that had adopted legislation enabling 
payday loans, a financial literacy expert, and Jackson’s son. 
Ultimately, Jesse Jackson hoped the show would ease the way for 
payday lenders to thrive in the communities about which he cares 
so deeply. 
When I thought about this incident over the ensuing months, 
I became less and less surprised. From the perspective of 
financial services, the low- and middle-income (LMI) communities 
in our great cities face disheartening challenges. Their need for 
                                                                                                     
 † This Article was presented as the keynote speech at the Regulation in 
the Fringe Economy Symposium. 
 * Albert E. Cinelli Enterprise Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I 
thank David Skeel and Jay Westbrook for useful comments, and the 
participants at the 2011 Regulation in the Fringe Economy symposium, held at 
Washington and Lee University School of Law, for stimulating discussion. 
 1. See generally Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 
UCLA L. REV. 855 (2007) (discussing payday lending). 
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financial infrastructure has grown markedly during the Great 
Recession: 
• millions of LMI households are under water on their 
mortgages;2 
• millions of LMI households are mired in long-term 
unemployment that strains their ability to meet 
regular expenses;3 
• millions of LMI households are so underinsured that 
they face rapidly rising out-of-pocket costs for health 
care;4 
• education costs are rising at rates far in excess of 
inflation at the same time as pressures from 
globalization make advanced learning a basic 
necessity for economic survival;5 
• and finally, because I like to talk about data, we have 
just learned from the Census Bureau’s “Supplemental 
Poverty Measure” that the number of households in 
poverty has been undercounted—by millions—for the 
last several decades.6 
                                                                                                     
 2. See Roland Li, U.S. Underwater Mortgages Down Slightly in 3Q: 
CoreLogic, INT’L BUS. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2011, available at http://www.ibtimes.com/ 
articles/258084/20111129/u-s-underwater-mortgages-slightly-3q-corelogic.htm 
(stating that, according to a CoreLogic report, in the third quarter of 2011, the 
number of underwater U.S. mortgages decreased from 10.9 to 10.7 million). 
 3. See DEC. 2011 BUREAU OF LAB. STATS. EMP. SITUATION NEWS RELEASE, at 
2, available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf. 
 4. See Addressing Underinsurance in National Health Reform: Hearing of 
the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 111th Cong. 82 (2009) 
(prepared statement of Sen. Sherrod Brown) (discussing the large portion of 
underinsured Americans and the significant out-of-pocket costs they are faced 
with). 
 5. See Trends in College Pricing 2011, COLLEGE BOARD, 
http://advocacy.collegeboard.org/college-affordability-financial-aid/trends-higher-
education/publications/trends-college-pricing-2011 (last visited Apr. 6, 2012) 
(discussing the continuing rise in higher education costs) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 6. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE RESEARCH SUPPLEMENTAL POVERTY 
MEASURE: 2010 (Nov. 2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011 
pubs/p60-241.pdf (introducing and describing the new supplemental poverty 
measure and comparing it to the traditional measurement results). 
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As their need for financial services has grown, Congress has 
moved briskly to undermine the financial institutions that serve 
these communities, especially the community banks and credit 
unions on whom they depend for deposit-account services and 
small-business lending. Among other things, by singling out large 
institutions for what amounts to a federal guaranty of their 
obligations,7 the Financial Stability Act8 raises the relative cost of 
borrowing for smaller institutions,9 which do not get that 
guaranty. 
Similarly, closer to home for me and our topic, the Durbin 
Amendment10 fixes prices for debit-card interchange at a 
markedly below-market level.11 Because of economies of scale in 
debit-card processing, the fixed price is several multiples of the 
costs large banks incur in those transactions, but substantially 
below the costs of the typical credit union or community bank.12 
Both statutes relatively disadvantage those institutions. It is all 
but inevitable that they will close branches in areas populated by 
their least creditworthy customers—the LMI households about 
whom I am talking today. 
That brings me to my topic for the day. Can we make sense of 
this problem? Are those who care deeply about LMI communities 
lashing out in the wrong direction when they complain about 
bank closings? Are they insane to welcome the alternative-service 
providers that fill the gaps the mainstream financial institutions 
leave behind? How, precisely, should we think about regulating 
                                                                                                     
 7. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1105, 124 Stat 1376, 2121 (2010) (creating an emergency 
financial stabilization program that guarantees certain obligations of the largest 
banks). 
 8. See id. §§ 101–176, 124 Stat. at 1391–1442. 
 9. See DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE 
DODD–FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 81 (2011) (explaining 
that large financial institutions can borrow more cheaply than smaller ones). 
 10. See Dodd–Frank § 1075(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 2068–74 (to be codified as 
EFTA § 920, 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2). 
 11. See id. § 1075(a)(2). 
 12. See David S. Evans, Robert E. Litan & Richard Schmalensee, Economic 
Analysis of the Effects of the Federal Reserve Board’s Proposed Debit Card 
Interchange Fee Regulations on Consumers and Small Businesses (2011), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1769887 (last visited Apr. 6, 
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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LMI financial services in the post-recession environment in which 
we live? 
I want to break this down into two stages. First, I want to 
discuss the modern, post-recession regulatory strategy, the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) being the 
exemplar here. Second, I’m going to explain two fundamental 
flaws at the heart of this strategy—its emphasis on solutions 
targeted at the problems of white, middle-class households, and 
its premise that the basic problem with financial services lies in 
the market interface between the financial-services firm and its 
customer. 
II. Regulatory Strategy After the Great Recession: The Exemplar 
of the CFPB 
The creation of the CFPB in Dodd–Frank’s Consumer 
Financial Protection Act13 is a breath of fresh air to academics 
interested in the regulatory state. Its basic function and design 
draw directly on academic work from successful law professors at 
leading institutions.14 More importantly, the writings and public 
statements of those who have selected its key personnel and are 
most likely to influence its forward path—Elizabeth Warren, 
Michael Barr, Oren Bar-Gill, and Sendhil Mullainathan—suggest 
that its regulatory strategy will be founded directly on academic 
work in behavioral economics. 
It is easy to see why this excites those who support the 
agency for more instrumental reasons—a felt need for more 
constraints on the providers of financial products to consumers. 
The trendy academic cachet of behavioral economics documents a 
fundamental flaw in the rational-actor model drawn from Ronald 
Coase’s work as the foundation for traditional “Posnerian” law 
and economics. It turns out, if you watch carefully, that people in 
fact do not make fully rational decisions.15 Indeed, if you’re 
                                                                                                     
 13. See Dodd–Frank §§ 1001–1100H, 124 Stat at 1955–2113 (creating the 
CFPB). 
 14. See SKEEL, supra note 9, at 100 (stating that the CFPB was conceived 
by Harvard Law Professor Elizabeth Warren, whose articles formed the 
blueprint for the CFPB). 
 15. See RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS xxi (1991) (“Quasi 
rational behavior exists, and it matters. In some well-defined situations, people 
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thoughtful enough, you can make enough sense of their 
nonsensical behavior to characterize them as “predictably 
irrational.”16 
But there is more here than a “gotcha” from academics and 
policymakers who have grumbled under a quarter century of the 
austere domination of rational-actor analysis. The important 
thing is that the policy prescriptions that come with behavioral 
economics are much more satisfying to those seeking regulation 
than the prescriptions of Coasian doctrine as viewed through the 
lens of traditional law and economics. (For my part, I’ve never 
thought Coase’s work lent that much support to traditional law 
and economics, but that’s a topic for another day.) If people act 
irrationally, then government (at least in theory) can improve 
market outcomes by “nudging” them toward better choices. This 
is of course overtly paternalistic, but once we know we are 
moving people toward rationality, that seems easy to swallow. 
So the hot subject in behaviorally benign regulatory theory 
becomes the selection of the proper lever for intervention—we 
focus on “asymmetric paternalism” that limits the considered 
choices of a few to improve the reckless decision-making of the 
many.17 
To be sure, if you read carefully, you detect a troubling tone 
of insistence: if the consumers will not make the right choices, 
well then we will just have to make choices for them. Bar-Gill and 
Warren liken financial products to toasters: if we do not let 
Sunbeam sell a toaster that catches fire one out of a hundred 
                                                                                                     
make decisions that are systematically and substantively different from those 
predicted by the standard economic model. Quasi rational behavior can be 
observed under careful laboratory controls and in natural economic settings 
such as the stock market.”). 
 16. See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL xx (revised and expanded ed. 
2010) (2008) (“[W]e are really far less rational than standard economic theory 
assumes. Moreover, these irrational behaviors of ours are neither random nor 
senseless. They are systematic, and since we repeat them again and again, 
predictable.”). 
 17. Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral 
Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 
1254 (2003) (stating that “asymmetric paternalism helps those whose rationality 
is bounded from making a costly mistake and harms more rational folks very 
little”). 
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times, why should we let CitiBank sell a mortgage that causes 
financial disaster for the homeowner one out of twenty times?18 
Barr, Mullainathan, and Shafir’s discussion of sticky 
disclosures19 is more subtle—and perhaps more informative given 
Mullainathan’s position at the heart of the agency.20 They discuss 
guiding homeowners into a fixed-rate, fully amortizing 
mortgage.21 They like that product, of course, because it avoids 
the risks of balloon payments and interest-rate shock. And if 
consumers will not choose it in the market, then they 
contemplate adopting ever-harsher disclosure rules for other 
products, raising transaction costs and the like in an effort to 
work ever harder to force consumers to make the choice they 
prefer.22 But what Barr, Mullainathan, and Shafir do not ever 
consider is the cost differential between the gold-standard 
product they prefer and the other products in the marketplace.23 
Especially with the departure (or at least uncertainty) of 
                                                                                                     
 18. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2008) (“Why are consumers protected from dangerous products 
and sharp business practices when they purchase tangible consumer products, 
but left at the mercy of their creditors when they sign up for routine financial 
products like mortgages and credit cards?”); Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any 
Rate, DEMOCRACY, Summer 2007, http://www.democracyjournal.org/5/6528.php 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2012) (“It is impossible to buy a toaster that has a one-in-
five chance of bursting into flames . . . [b]ut it is possible to refinance . . . with a 
mortgage that has the same one-in-five chance of putting the family out on the 
street . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 19. See Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, The Case 
for Behaviorally Informed Regulation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 27, 
43–48 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009) (proposing a sticky opt-out 
mortgage system). 
 20. See Maya Jackson Randall & Justin Lahart, Harvard Economist to Join 
Consumer Bureau, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704681904576317503890946370.html (last visited Apr. 6, 
2012) (describing Mullainathan’s joining the CFPB to run its Office of Research) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 21. See Barr, Mullainathan & Shafir, supra note 19, at 44–45 (suggesting a 
“fixed-rate, self-amortizing thirty-year mortgage loan” as a default, which 
consumers may then opt out of). 
 22. See id. at 46 (suggesting “a default to be offered, accompanied by 
required heightened disclosures and increased legal exposure for deviations” in 
an effort to “make high-road lending more profitable than low-road lending”). 
 23. It bears noting that the “standard” fully amortizing 30-year mortgage is 
not readily available in other countries, largely because lenders regard the 
associated risk of opportunistic prepayment as so high to make underwriting at 
reasonable interest rates impractical. 
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government guaranties in the secondary mortgage market, the 
interest-rate spreads between these products and products with 
balloons or adjustable rates often may be so high that many 
consumers would be priced out of homes if they were forced into 
the “safe” product. (I know this sounds like an unreal concern 
today, but I am assuming that someday the recession will end 
and we will return to a “normal” housing market.) 
A parallel initiative in credit-card markets, a “safe credit 
cards” project at the Pew Institute, is the intellectual ancestor of 
the “vanilla product” authority in Dodd–Frank.24 The idea is 
that if banks would only issue a “safe” or standardized credit-
card product, consumers with the option to take the “safe” 
product could retain the convenience of credit cards without 
being exposed to the “tricks and traps” of traditional credit-card 
lenders. The problem, though—to quote the old Ferengi adage—
is that “there’s no profit in it.” The business model of modern 
credit-card lenders is segmentation—to identify a specific 
segment of the populace for which a specific targeted product is 
more attractive than any competing product, and thus to serve 
that segment with a product that (because of its attractiveness) 
can be priced more aggressively than more standardized 
products that might appeal to a larger segment of the 
populace.25 The more standardized a product, the more it is 
“commoditized,” the more easily others can copy it, and thus, the 
more easily they can compete on price and other terms. So the 
last thing any credit-card issuer is going to emphasize is a 
vanilla product, and the pricing an issuer rationally would put 
on such a product will all but ensure that it is the least 
attractive product in the portfolio. 
I should mention another heartening aspect of behavioral 
economics as the inspiration for the CFPB: its emphasis on data 
and empirical work. Behavioral economics is, at its heart, an 
                                                                                                     
 24. See generally Safe Credit Cards Project, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/our_work_detail.aspx?id=616 (last visited Apr. 6, 
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 25. See Ronald J. Mann, Patterns of Credit Card Use Among Low- and 
Moderate-Income Households, in INSUFFICIENT FUNDS: SAVINGS, ASSETS, CREDIT, 
AND BANKING AMONG LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 257, 258–62 (Rebecca M. Blank 
& Michael S. Barr eds., 2009) (describing the business strategy of market 
segmentation as it is used in the credit-card industry). 
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empirical subdiscipline: for the most part, its scholars conduct 
experiments designed to test the rationality of their subjects, 
and they write papers using econometric statistical techniques 
to argue that the results demonstrate significant departures 
from pure rationality.26 So we have empirical papers 
documenting flaws in the theoretical predictions of rational-
actor analysis (which has often been empirically sterile).  
So it comes as no surprise that behavioralism in the policy 
arena has a strong data-driven flair. Thus, we have seen the 
Federal Reserve in the last few years conducting extensive field-
testing of the disclosures it requires for consumer financial 
products.27 Previously written by lawyers, in language that only 
the most highly specialized legal minds could hope to follow, the 
last round of disclosures under the Truth in Lending Act 
(TILA)28 is a vast improvement in comprehensibility and 
functionality. Early reports from the CFPB suggest that it will 
be driven by the same instincts. Given the prevalence of adverse 
unintended consequences from regulatory intervention, this is a 
major step forward.29 
The CFPB’s report on remittances is a good example of how 
all of this can work well.30 Presumably most of you in this 
audience will recall that Section 1073 of Dodd–Frank (part of 
the CFPA) added a new section to the Electronic Fund Transfer 
                                                                                                     
 26. See, e.g., ARIELY, supra note 16, at xviii–xxii (describing the discipline 
of behavioral economics). 
 27. See Consumer Research Testing, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE SYSTEM, http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/consumerresearch_ 
testing.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2012) (providing links to reports from Board-
sponsored and interagency testing of new disclosures) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 28. See Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, §§ 101–145, 82 
Stat. 146 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667). 
 29. To be sure, there are risks here as well, especially if the relatively 
ready availability of data from larger institutions motivates the Bureau to focus 
its attention on the activities of the larger institutions, allowing smaller 
(presumptively less reputationally constrained) institutions to fly beneath the 
Bureau’s radar. See infra Part IV (suggesting that the largest institutions are 
the most likely to be law-abiding and that by singling them out for regulatory 
attention, Dodd–Frank takes a step in the wrong direction). 
 30. See CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, REPORT ON REMITTANCE 
TRANSFERS (2011), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/wp-content/ 
uploads/2011/07/Report_20110720_RemittanceTransfers.pdf. 
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Act (EFTA)31 regulating remittance transfers.32 This is an 
important and under-studied subject, at least in part because of 
the importance to the recipient economies of the funds sent by 
these transfers. And it is also important for my work because the 
overwhelming source of remittances is LMI workers in this 
country, who are often neither citizens, nor even lawfully present 
in this country. So this is a group of people who will not be the 
target customers for heavily advertised products from the large 
money-center banks. The market, as it happens, is to this day 
dominated by Western Union. 
There is much to praise in CFPB’s report on remittances. For 
one thing, it recommends a single price metric that combines all 
of the various charges. In some ways, this is an old trick, 
reminiscent of TILA’s consolidation of charges into specified 
disclosure categories. But the emphasis on “all-in” pricing is 
broader here, and reflects more of the reality of consumer choice. 
For products like this one, an emphasis on comparing exchange 
rates is no more useful than comparing interest rates on super-
short-term LMI products. The real question of relevance to the 
purchaser is “how much money will end up in Guatemala if I give 
you $200 today?” A single all-in price figure is behaviorally 
benign (because it is easy to understand and compare), and thus 
feeds directly into informed decision-making. 
The report also does an excellent job of facilitating price 
competition in a realistic way. Among other things, the report 
recommends facilitating online information intermediaries that 
would be able to provide real-time comparisons of exchange rates 
and related fees. (This is similar to provisions in the CARD Act33 
requiring issuers to post their credit card agreements online; Jim 
Hawkins here has started a project looking at some of those.) 
More broadly, the report emphasizes the importance of guiding 
                                                                                                     
 31. See Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 
1978 § 2001, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3737 (adding Title IX, §§ 901–921 to 
the Consumer Credit Protection Act). 
 32. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1073, 124 Stat. 1376, 2060–67 (2010) (to be codified as 
EFTA § 919, 15 U.S.C. 1693o-1). 
 33. See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (to be codified as TILA § 122(d), 15 
U.S.C. 1632(d)). 
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dissemination of price and transaction information on more 
modern channels—mobile phones, text messages, and the like. 
This is a far cry from the Fed’s stodgy reliance on paper-based 
disclosures under the EFTA, which stifle payments innovation to 
the present day. 
III. What’s Not to Like? 
So what’s wrong with this picture? Who could ask for 
anything more—an agency with an academically validated 
mission, a central staff including numerous informed scholars, 
and a cadre of experienced advocates hand-picked by the 
academics that brought the agency into being. My goal today is to 
sketch out, briefly, two fundamental flaws in the intellectual 
foundations of the agency. Both flaws share a single feature: a 
narrowing of focus that excludes much, if not most, of the 
relevant regulatory domain. The first is a focus on the white 
middle class: what we’re getting is regulatory strategies designed 
by and for traditional middle-class households, their behavioral 
tendencies, and their problems. The second is a narrowing of 
focus to the interface between the firm and its customer: 
behavioral economics is a tool for improving the interactions that 
occur at that interface, but it says nothing about (and thus 
diverts attention from) anything else in society or the economy 
that might be relevant.  
On the first point, the starting point for much of the writing 
in this area is the explicit premise that financial services 
providers use “tricks and traps” to ensnare the “consumers” to 
whom they provide services. We see this pervasively in 
scholarship about consumer bankruptcy that documents the 
tragic victimization of wholly innocent middle-class families beset 
by the unpredictable storms of a modern capitalist economy.34 
Oren Bar-Gill’s work, though starkly different in its economistic 
                                                                                                     
 34. See, e.g., Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory 
Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2002) (labeling payday lenders “predators 
because they reap generous profits by taking advantage of consumers through 
means that are not only grossly unfair but, in many cases, also entirely 
unlawful” (citation omitted)); Warren, supra note 18 (“Lenders have deliberately 
built tricks and traps into some credit products so they can ensnare families in a 
cycle of high-cost debt.”); Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 18. 
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texture, is intellectually parallel: his best work shows how 
market forces drive credit-card issuers to design products that 
“seduce” consumers by playing on their predictably infra-rational 
behavioral weaknesses.35 
Several points about this warrant attention. The first is the 
emphasis on a particular type of household. Academic work about 
consumer financial distress is dominated by concern for middle-
class households.36 Some of this surely is accidental, 
subconscious. Few academics are from LMI households; few 
academics at elite institutions are minorities; academics at all 
levels are disproportionately from the Northeast, with a 
substantial share from the West Coast, but few from the interior 
regions. So if their perspective on financial services and distress 
is informed at all by personal experience, it will be a personal 
experience that is quite narrow and, frankly, alien to my own. 
The narrowed focus also has a more instrumental and political 
basis. As we see from welfare reform, policies targeted at the 
middle class are more successful.37  
                                                                                                     
 35. See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1376 
(2004) (calling the credit card “a tool designed to exploit consumers’ 
underestimation bias” and stating that “if the credit card market is as 
competitive as it appears to be, insurers have to exploit consumers’ imperfect 
rationality in order to survive in this market”). 
 36. See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE 
WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 27 (2000) (stating 
that “bankruptcy is a middle-class phenomenon”); TERESA A. SULLIVAN, 
ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR 
DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 10–11 (1999) (“At an 
early point in this project . . . the income figures made us believe that 
bankruptcy was being used almost exclusively by the lower middle class as a 
safety net from poverty.”); ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE 
TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS PARENTS ARE GOING BROKE 194 n.12 
(2004) (“Among families in bankruptcy, 92 percent include [someone] who 
completed at least some college (57 percent), held a job in the upper 80 
percentile of occupational prestige (70 percent), and/or owned a home (58 
percent). Two-thirds . . . met two or more criteria, and 27 percent met all three.” 
(citation omitted)); Elizabeth Warren, The Growing Threat to Middle Class 
Families, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 401, 405 (2004) (stating that most of those families 
that end up in financial trouble, including bankruptcy, “are ordinary, middle-
class people united by their determination to provide a decent life for their 
children”). 
 37. See, e.g., MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE (1999); LANE 
KENWORTHY, PROGRESS FOR THE POOR (2012). 
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Collectively, the narrowed focus plays elegantly into the 
classic neoliberal regulatory strategy: using paternalistic 
intervention to correct market imperfections.38 The strategy 
works best on those who are “like us” because we understand 
their needs and limitations best. There is, in a way, a “shared” 
sense of what counts as good decision-making when we focus on 
the financial services and choices that confront the middle class: 
we can understand their needs, we can recognize what mistakes 
they might make, and we can see from above how to substitute 
our better choices for theirs. What we need, then, is a regulatory 
frame that is based on a socially realistic model of consumer 
financial activity. 
The existing literature, as well as ongoing work by several 
people, affords a lot of guidance. John Caskey’s work on fringe 
banking sets the perfect tone here, explaining that one reason 
LMI households use pawnshops and check-cashing stores instead 
of banks is simply that they are cheaper than the alternatives 
available to them.39 This is an important point, because the 
victimization thread of the neoliberal strategy rests on the 
explicit premise that the poor are simply not capable of taking 
care of their own money.40 It is only a slight caricature to say that 
the highest aspiration of the financial literacy scholarship is to 
get the poor to come to more seminars about how to calculate 
compound interest because we know that then they will be smart 
enough to avoid high-cost financial products.41 
But there is a burgeoning empirical literature suggesting 
that households that use alternative financial services are in fact 
                                                                                                     
 38. See DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 64–81 (2007) 
(describing the neoliberal tendency to favor state intervention over market 
independence and democracy in matters such as protection of financial 
interests). 
 39. See JOHN CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, 
PAWNSHOPS, AND THE POOR 84–110 (1994) (discussing reasons why low- and 
moderate-income households are driven from bank accounts to fringe providers). 
 40. See id. at 9 (describing some common criticisms of LMI households who 
patronize fringe banks). 
 41. See Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Financial Literacy and 
Planning: Implications for Retirement Wellbeing 16–17 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 17078, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w17078 (discussing the correlation between financial literacy, 
determined by familiarity with interest compounding and inflation, and 
retirement planning). 
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pretty good managers of their money. Stango and Zinman, for 
example, show that LMI households do an admirable job of 
balancing use and payments among the various credit accounts 
they hold.42 Similarly, work by Bertrand and Morse (and 
preliminary results from an ongoing survey in which I am 
involved) suggests that payday-lending customers have a 
surprisingly accurate understanding of how they will use the 
product.43 Most of them expect to roll over their loans, and their 
estimates of how long they will continue borrowing are 
surprisingly accurate.44 So it is simply not right to say that they 
are borrowing because of an unjustifiably optimistic view that 
they will somehow come up with funds to make themselves debt-
free by their next payday. 
Seen through that lens, I think we have to accept, 
notwithstanding the high costs, that one reason households are 
choosing payday loans instead of credit cards and fixed-term 
bank loans is that they make more sense for them in their milieu. 
For one thing, they are a lot easier to understand than credit 
cards: the charges on payday loans are collected up front, 
typically in one single fee, of which the customer is aware before 
leaving the counter.45 
                                                                                                     
 42. See Victor Stango & Jonathan Zinman, Borrowing High vs. Borrowing 
Higher: Sources and Consequences of Dispersion in Individual Borrowing Costs 
22–23 (Nov. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.aeaweb. 
org/aea/2012conference/program/retrieve.php?pdfid=443 (finding that most 
borrowers allocate debt and repayments to their lowest-rate card or cards, and 
that misallocation explains little of the variation in borrowing costs) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 43. See Marianne Bertrand & Adair Morse, Information Disclosure, 
Cognitive Biases and Payday Borrowing 17–18, 34 (Univ. of Chi. Booth Sch. Of 
Bus., Working Paper No. 10-01, Oct. 2009), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1532213 (discussing some of the cognitive 
mistakes payday borrowers make, and stating that payday borrowers do have 
cognitive biases that lead to mistakes in decision making, but suggesting that 
these biases and mistakes may be less common than many assume them to be). 
 44. See id. at 18 (comparing actual repayment time with people’s 
expectations of repayment time and stating that, although there was 
substantial variation, the mean estimate was close to the correct answer of five 
to six weeks). 
 45. See id. at 16–17 (“In contrast to other subprime lending, payday 
lending is widely believed to be a fairly transparent transaction: payday 
borrowers must all realize that the loan costs $17 per $100 of borrowed funds.”). 
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Who among us knows exactly what the “all-in” costs of 
borrowing are on any of the credit cards we so routinely pull from 
our wallets? Even assuming (with the kind of optimism we scoff 
at in LMI households) that we always pay all of our bills in their 
entirety, every month, do we really remember which cards have 
annual fees, how much they are, what the rewards are that offset 
the fees, and how likely it is that we will, in fact, use those 
rewards? I would make a strong case that the LMI households 
know a lot more about the fees they pay to financial institutions 
than most academics do. That makes some sense, if you want to 
talk about the declining marginal utility of money and the 
opportunity cost of our time: I am sure I have good reasons for 
ignoring those things. But that just makes the point even more 
strongly: there are good reasons to think that less well-off 
households, for whom the marginal dollar is really tight, should 
pay attention to those fees, and the products they are choosing 
are not so obviously inconsistent with their capability to do that. 
A related point is the relative risks of the products between 
which households choose. It is a common assumption in the 
financial-literacy literature that LMI households borrow from 
payday lenders when they have unused credit available on credit 
cards.46 But from the LMI perspective, this makes perfect sense. I 
will offer two different strategies. 
• First, if we want to discuss the long-term risks of a 
product, entanglement in long-term borrowing is an 
important concern. Here, payday loans are far less 
perilous than credit cards. As I have written before 
(with Jim Hawkins), payday loan balances are self-
limiting.47 The payday lender is not going to lend 
beyond the amount of the next paycheck—and not 
often beyond half of that amount. The credit-card 
lender, by contrast, readily will lend a substantial 
fraction of a year’s salary, and in times of distress, 
                                                                                                     
 46. See generally Summit Agerwal, Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy 
Tobacman, Payday Loans and Credit Cards: New Liquidity and Credit Scoring 
Puzzles?, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 412 (2009). 
 47. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 1, at 886 (noting that “unlike credit 
card lending, payday lending has a limited potential to spiral into escalating 
levels of borrowing”). 
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might hold a debt exceeding a year’s salary.48 To be 
sure, this rationale might support information-based 
reforms that make it harder for borrowers to stack 
payday loans from multiple providers, or federal 
intervention to control internet payday lenders that 
help avoid state regulations on those issues, but those 
problems seem to be a detail in the larger picture. 
• Second, rational borrowers would regard open credit-
card lines as a valuable store of liquidity. Indeed, 
qualitative data suggest that they regard the unused 
credit as an asset in the same way a middle-class 
household would view a savings account: something 
stored up to be drawn down only in an emergency. 
But from the LMI perspective, this is wholly sensible. 
The great value of the credit-card lender is the 
likelihood that the credit-card lender will extend 
funds to you even after the adverse shock (loss of 
employment, etc.) that would scare off other lenders 
(banks, or even payday lenders). So the prudent 
household would precommit to “saving” the credit 
card line for the direst of emergencies. 
The final point here is a little harder to pin down, but 
probably the most important of all: the members of LMI 
households, for various reasons, simply do not like banks. They 
do not trust them to be fair. They do not trust their products to be 
transparent. They are not comfortable going into their 
branches.49 The banks have brought this on themselves to a large 
extent, with the competition-driven frenzied rush to identify new 
and ever-more particularized streams of fee income. The backlash 
about overdraft fees, culminating in the recent amendments to 
Regulation E restricting those fees,50 is only the most obvious 
                                                                                                     
 48. See Allison Mann, Ronald Mann & Sophie Staples, Debt, Bankruptcy, 
and Life Course Mobility 13–14 (Nov. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) 
(discussing a regression estimating the relation between household income and 
credit-card debt) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 49. See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand et al., A Behavioral-Economics View of 
Poverty, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 419, 420 (2004); Luigi Guiso, A Trust-Driven 
Financial Crisis. Implications for the Future of Financial Markets (European 
Univ. Inst., Working Paper No. 2010/07). 
 50. See Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. § 205.17 (2011). 
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example. But whatever the cause, it gives that share of the 
market a baseline preference for the product that does not come 
from a mainstream financial institution. 
The salient data point here is Walmart: Americans that are 
not wealthy like buying things from Walmart. They know what 
they are going to get: passable quality and unimaginably low 
prices. So when Walmart sells financial services, consumers are 
attracted because they assume that prices will be low and that 
they are not going to be tricked. Some might think that $3 to cash 
a paycheck is a lot when we can deposit checks for free with an 
app on our cellphones. But to the customer that cashes checks at 
Walmart instead of investigating opening a bank account the 
choice is easy. He knows he is only going to spend $3 a month, 
and he is going to be at Walmart anyway. To open a bank 
account, first he has to go to a bank, which is not fun or 
convenient. Then, he has to hope that he can find an account that 
will let him get his money without additional fees, which in truth 
is pretty unlikely. Then, he has to think about the likelihood that, 
even if the account sounds good when he signs up for it, he will 
end up paying a lot of fees that the bank hid from him, made up 
after the fact, or simply cheated him out of. I am still sure I was 
right when I wrote several years ago that the best thing we could 
do for financial competition would be to let Walmart have a 
bank.51 But of course we did not do that, so we are still stuck with 
the kind of banks we had before the recession. In the end, when it 
comes down to it, it is no different now than it was when Caskey 
wrote: the smart ones do not even try going to banks.  
Turning now to my second main point: a great deal of LMI 
households’ financial problems come not from mistreatment by 
financial services providers, but from the more basic problem that 
LMI households often face chronic money shortages. The problem 
is that they are poor. This sounds tautological, but it links up to 
the most fundamental flaw with using behavioral economics as 
the base for regulatory strategy. The basic problem is that 
embracing behavioral economics implicitly embraces the 
underlying assumption that what is wrong with financial 
                                                                                                     
 51. See Ronald J. Mann, A Requiem for Sam’s Bank, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
953, 956 (2008) (“[A] powerful case can be made that granting Wal-Mart’s 
application would have had a salutary effect on a market that has seen too little 
competition and innovation for the last two decades.”). 
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services—what needs to be fixed—is the interaction between the 
customer and the firm. If we could only get “consumers” to choose 
the “right products,” then we would return to a golden age of well-
considered use of financial products. 
But to state this as the premise is refutation enough. The 
false dichotomy is between rational-actor models—the contracts 
must be efficient because they exist—and behavioral models—the 
contracts cannot be perfect, because predictably irrational 
consumers agreed to them. The correct dichotomy is between 
“fixing the market” (the narrow-focused economic approach) and 
a broader approach, founded on the idea that the role of 
government is to supply appropriate market-supporting 
institutions. To turn this around, if we think that LMI 
households would suffer financially even if they made perfectly 
rational choices among the financial products available to them, 
then neither of the rational-actor or behavioralist strategies is 
constructive. Indeed, the seductive power of the behavioralist 
strategy is its promise of activist regulators, intervening 
aggressively to solve important problems. But in truth, I suggest, 
the main effect of that strategy is to divert attention from real 
solutions to the real problems that plague LMI finances. What we 
need to do is help them with the difficulties of being poor, not 
pretend that their poverty is irrelevant to their financial choices. 
In some respects, this is the point where my presentation 
falls apart, because many of the sources of economic dislocation 
that I summarized when I began are so far removed from the 
financial services industry as to be completely beyond my ken—
rapidly rising expenses for education and health care, increasing 
rates of employment turnover, and plummeting real-estate values 
that leave households locked in to insupportable and unrealistic 
mortgage payments. 
There also is the problem that my dichotomy between 
firm/customer problems and broader market problems is 
arbitrary, given the situation of both firms and customers in that 
market, and the close relation between that market and the 
products firms can market successfully to households. But having 
said that, and acknowledging the overlap with the discussion 
above, I want to flesh out a few more points that seem to me too 
broad to situate appropriately within the narrow behavioralist 
frame of the product-centered firm/consumer interface. 
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The most important one is the surreal perception of 
consumer budgeting that dominates the perspective of academics 
and financial literacy advocates. Implicit in the analysis of the 
“debt trap” of payday borrowing52 is the treatment of the 
transactions of customers that enter a cycle of payday borrowing 
as making a large loan at the beginning of the cycle, and steadily 
saving up, little by little, until they have collected enough funds 
to repay the loan. Then, looking at the interest rate for a loan of 
that term, they conclude that alternative products with an 
equivalent term could have served the borrower’s long-term 
borrowing needs much less expensively. 
But I want to suggest that this fundamentally 
misapprehends the reality of distressed households’ extremely 
short time horizons for financial decision-making. I envision 
these households, based on the interviews I have done on various 
qualitative projects, as living their financial life almost literally 
“from day to day,” sorting expenses during each pay period based 
directly on the creditor’s threat point: what will happen if I do not 
pay this expense out of this paycheck? Is it worse to let the light 
bill go 60 days behind or the credit-card bill 120 days behind? 
(Answer: light bill, because the utility company might actually 
turn off the electricity.) Is it worse to forgo repairing the car or 
borrow for the fourth pay period in a row from a payday lender? 
(Likely answer: Repairing the car, because if you miss work again 
you will be fired.) Behind all of this is the reality that the 
household will stop visiting the payday lender not when it has 
saved up enough money to pay back the loan; it will be repaid 
when a pay period comes that does not involve any expense 
important enough to trump the benefits of savings the $45 fee 
that comes from borrowing $300 this month. 
Among other things, this picture suggests a considerably 
different view of rollovers and repetitive borrowing than much of 
the literature.53 It is just not a useful question to ask whether we 
should stop these people from borrowing because they do not 
                                                                                                     
 52. See, e.g., Uriah King & Leslie Parrish, Springing the Debt Trap: Rate 
Caps Are Only Proven Payday Lending Reform, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE 
LENDING (Dec. 13, 2007), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/ 
payday-lending/research-analysis/springing-the-debt-trap.pdf. 
 53. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 34, at 55–77 (describing rollovers and the 
problems associated with them). 
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understand the high interest rates they are paying. There is no 
doubt, for at least a large group of these families, that the all-in 
costs of borrowing are dwarfed by the opportunity costs of what 
they would lose if they did not borrow. If we stop their borrowing, 
we will simply drive them directly into the loss of that far more 
costly opportunity—the lost job or cut-off utilities they used the 
loan to avert. 
The relevant question is the much harsher, less comfortable 
one: should we stop them from borrowing because we all would be 
better off if they fell off the financial cliff and filed for bankruptcy 
today, instead of borrowing and struggling indefinitely in a 
Dickensian effort to find the silver cloud that is always “just 
around the corner?” I for one know very little about the 
trajectories of these borrowers: after borrowing repetitively for 
months, how many of them eventually fail, and how many 
eventually recover? For how long do they stagnate in the cycle of 
repetitive borrowing? And, in the end, how likely is it that their 
situation would improve even if they did use bankruptcy to get a 
completely fresh start? If we knew the answers to these 
questions, we could formulate a sensible intention to nudge (or 
force) them away from (or toward) these products. And if we 
wanted to nudge them toward these products (because we decided 
that a large enough group used them to come out the other end of 
the tunnel), we would want to figure out how to make the 
products more accessible, not less—ways to use regulatory design 
to facilitate price competition that could nudge the price 
downward rather than regulatory hostility to drive effective 
prices upward. 
IV. Challenges 
So where does this lead? These are transparently intractable 
questions. I hardly even have intuitions about how to answer 
these questions, and investigating them would be a challenge 
even for a skilled and well-funded academic. But it does, I think, 
suggest a number of things both for regulators and academics. 
For one thing, if the CFPB aspires to improve the lot of those 
that use the products it regulates, it is crucial that it move 
beyond the “flaming toaster” model of regulation. Fixing the 
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product will not help anybody if “fixing” is functionally the same 
as banning, and if the product is the best alternative available to 
consumers. If the agency wants to do justice to its academic roots 
it has to take a broader perspective, situating the products in the 
institutional settings in which they are embedded and assessing 
the real effects of regulation on the broad menu of choices 
available to households. That may require new rounds of 
behavioral research, attempting to understand how the cognitive 
landscape that shapes the choices of those that use “fringe” 
financial products.54 And in truth I don’t think the questions I 
pose above are intractable for an agency with the data-collection 
powers the CFPB will have if and when it has a director. 
And let me close with two other sets of questions that this 
framework raises. First, much of the focus of policymakers since 
the days of John Caskey’s work is on bringing LMI households 
into mainstream financial institutions. Our central questions 
focus on how many of them have bank accounts and use the same 
products as the middle class. I wonder if that is the right goal. If 
we accept the reality that households of greater financial 
instability have different sets of constraints and needs, maybe 
they need a different sort of financial institution: if it is so hard 
for banks to profit from serving these households, maybe we 
should try to foster other institutions that might serve them. We 
have heard for decades that “the poor pay more,” and that 
certainly is true in a lot of ways. But we are not all that upset 
that Walmart serves a different demographic than Target, and 
nobody is ever complaining that the poor pay more when they go 
to Walmart. So instead of spending so much time stamping out 
the Walmarts of the financial world, maybe we should try instead 
to bring them within the tent of “favored” financial providers—
coopting them to the mission of legitimacy instead of pressing 
them to the edge of illegality.55 
As the discussion above should make clear, Dodd–Frank is a 
step in exactly the wrong direction. In this particular sector, it 
                                                                                                     
 54. I am working on such a project already, investigating the extent to 
which optimism bias afflicts the borrowing decisions of payday loan customers. 
 55. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 1, at 905–12; cf. Sharon Collard, 
Anna Ellison & Rob Forster, Illegal Lending in the UK, POLICIS (Feb. 2006), 
available at http://www.bris.ac.uk/geography/research/pfrc/themes/credit-
debt/pfrc0707.pdf. 
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has singled out the largest institutions for regulatory attention 
for which small actors will be exempt.56 There are obvious 
reasons for limiting supervision to the largest actors, but in an 
industry where there is reason to think that the largest actors are 
the most likely to be law abiding,57 there is a distinct element of 
perversity in tilting the playing field to put those actors at a 
particular disadvantage. 
The second question, related to the first, is why do we have a 
regulatory model that forces short-term lending for the truly 
distressed into the two-week payday model? The existing 
regulatory system pretty much limits anybody who wants to do 
lawful, short-term lending to the two-week full-payment model 
tied to the historical roots in check-cashing of the product’s 
inventors. But there is nothing about the market other than the 
legal framework that forces them into that product, which 
consumer advocates hate so much: given the chance, I am 
convinced that the same lenders could profit on a product with a 
term of a few months instead of a few weeks, with a much lower 
interest rate (because of lower transactional costs per month of 
outstanding loan). I strongly support a project like the Russell 
Sage initiative that led to the small-loan laws almost a century 
ago58—a genuine collaboration among regulators, consumer 
advocates, and lenders focused on a goal of facilitating small-loan 
lending at the lowest practicably profitable rates by licensed and 
transparent lenders.59 I am convinced we could develop a product 
that would serve the backstopping needs of the poor much better 
than the existing products, with revenues sufficient to attract 
                                                                                                     
 56. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1024(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1987–88 (2010) (instituting 
CFPB regulatory supervision of the largest payday-loan provider). 
 57. It seems even more likely now than when I wrote with Jim Hawkins 
several years ago to be the case that the Internet-based and tribe-affiliated 
lenders that are effectively beyond the reach of the state regulators play an 
important role in the market, especially in states in which regulation of payday 
loans substantially constrains the provision of the product. See Mann & 
Hawkins, supra note 1, at 868–71 (discussing Internet providers of payday 
loans). 
 58. See ROBERT MAYER, QUICK CASH: THE STORY OF THE LOAN SHARK 45–46, 
73–74 (2010) (noting the role of the Russel Sage Foundation in leading efforts to 
draft what became the Uniform Small Loan Law). 
 59. See id. at 176–77 (noting the lack of a modern-day equivalent of the 
Russel Sage Foundation in the context of payday lending). 
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legitimate lenders. It would still bear an interest rate far above 
traditional usury ceilings, but if we face up to the reality of the 
situation, I think we could design something that fits their needs 
more directly, far more cheaply, and with a far lower risk of 
illegal lending than the existing statutory system. 
